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LEGAL ADVICE TOWARD ILLEGAL ENDS
Joel S. Newman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you discovered a wonderful fishing hole hidden on
some public lands. Would you be obligated to tell others about
it? Of course not. But, could you go out of your way to hide its
existence? Of course not-especially not from your friends.'
Lawyers, as a group, know many things which, practically
speaking, are hidden from others. For example, they know how
best to manage one's affairs so as to minimize tax liability. To
some, even a fair loophole would beat a great fishing hole any
time. Must lawyers tell everyone? Certainly, they can require
payment first; even lawyers have to make a living. Assuming,
however, that a lawyer does not need the money, can she go
out of her way to hide this information from her clients?' One
would think not.
What if the lawyer's special information were information
which could be used to break the law? Suppose, for example,
that a client asked a lawyer to furnish her with a list of coun-
tries which do not have extradition treaties with the United
States. There might be legitimate 'reasons for such a request,
but the most likely reason would be a desire to avoid prosecu-
tion for a committed crime. Should the lawyer comply?
Complying with the client's request could possibly further a
criminal endeavor. However, all that the client is requesting is
information on the law, which may well be too complex for the
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. A.B., Brown University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Wake Forest law professors Charles
Rose and Suzanne Reynolds for their helpful comments.
1. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Law-
yer.Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
2. Some argue that lawyers do so, by lobbying for laws so complex that only
they can understand them. That is a separate issue.
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client to discover herself. Did not Lon Fuller say that it is a
matter of the law's internal morality that it be promulgated in
such a way that people know what it is?3
If a lawyer were seeking to avoid prosecution, she would
have access to knowledge about extradition treaties. It would be
her sole decision to use that knowledge, for good or ill. Why is
it that a nonlawyer, when faced with the weight of the criminal
prosecution powers of the state, should have fewer options,
moral or immoral, than lawyers do?'
The conclusion to which this argument leads is that a lawyer
must tell her clients everything about the law that may be
helpful to them. Certainly, giving advice about the law is cen-
tral to what lawyers do, and it is crucial to their social worth.
However, if the lawyer goes beyond advice, and actively assists
the client in criminal activity, then she is guilty of aiding and
abetting. Neither the status of "lawyer" nor the obligation to
provide access to the law should exempt lawyers from the crim-
inal liabilities which face everyone else. Therefore, lawyers
must be encouraged to give advice, but they must be very care-
ful as to how they give it.
Lawyer advice is currently regulated by two sets of laws.
First, it is regulated by the lawyer ethics laws. Second, it is
regulated by the substantive laws of criminal aiding and abet-
ting, criminal conspiracy, and their civil counterparts. Under
the substantive law, lawyers are not liable unless they do some-
thing more active than merely furnishing advice.5 Generally,
the ethics laws are consistent with the substantive law.6 How-
ever, some of the ethics cases and much of the commentary
would discipline lawyers for mere passive advice.!
3. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49-51 (rev. ed. 1969).
4. Contra MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 65-66 (1980); 1 GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 52-53 (2d ed. 1991).
Should we attempt to ban this knowledge from those who do not already have it for
fear that they will misuse it? Of course, we cannot prevent those who are both so-
phisticated and unscrupulous from obtaining such knowledge and using it to their
advantage. Therefore, the only ones who would be affected by the ban would be those
who are relatively innocent and unsophisticated. Then, we must face the analogy of
the argument that, "If guns are outlawed, then only outlaws will have guns."
5. See infra notes 48, 50.
6. See infra note 51.
7. See infra notes 45, 46, 58, 60, 86 and accompanying text.
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This article argues that lawyer advice should be regulated
only by the substantive law and not by the lawyer ethics laws.
Lawyer advice, then, would only get the lawyer in trouble if the
lawyer actively assisted in lawbreaking. The article discusses
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including what they
say and how they have been interpreted. It also discusses the
case law, both under the ethics laws and under the substantive
law.
H. THE MODEL RULES
The attempt to deal with the subject of lawyer advice in the
ethics laws has led to confusion. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.2(d) provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.'
The Rule appears to contemplate three situations: (1) coun-
seling or assisting clients in criminal or fraudulent conduct; (2)
discussing the legal consequences of proposed conduct; and, (3)
test cases. The test case situation is beyond the scope of this
article. As to the other two, it is obvious that lawyers cannot
encourage their clients to commit crimes and frauds. It is
equally obvious that lawyers must be able to discuss with cli-
ents the legal consequences of proposed courses of conduct. If
that is not what lawyers do, what is? Yet, these two obvious
premises appear to be contradictory.
Comment 6 to Rule 1.2 provides:
A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the
actual consequences that appear likely to result from a
client's conduct. The fact that a client uses advice in a
course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
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itself, make a lawyer a party to the course of action. How-
ever, a lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in criminal
or fraudulent conduct. There is a critical distinction be-
tween presenting an analysis of legal aspects of question-
able conduct and recommending the means by which a
crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.'
The problem is that the client may well use that "analysis of
legal aspects of questionable conduct" to determine the "means
by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity."
If there is a "critical distinction," where is it?"°
It is clear from the second sentence of the comment that
illegal outcomes from lawyer advice do not automatically mean
that the advice was improper. If the outcome is not dispositive,
then the "critical distinction" must be found in the advice itself.
The Rule contrasts "counsel" and "assist" with "discuss." In par-
allel fashion, the fourth sentence of the comment contrasts
"presenting an analysis" with "recommending means." These
dichotomies suggest an active-passive distinction, a consider-
ation of purpose," but mostly an emphasis on the words used
by the lawyer.
Model Rule 1.2(d), then, is a rule of syntax. 2 If the lawyer
9. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 6 (1983). The suc-
ceeding Comment 7 deals with the problem of a client whose illegal or criminal con-
duct has already begun and is continuing when she consults the lawyer. I propose to
limit this discussion to illegal or criminal conduct which has not yet begun when the
lawyer is brought in. As to the extradition question, a crime has been committed, but
the additional crime of fleeing the country to escape prosecution has not.
10. In an earlier draft, a proposed Rule 2.3 would have prohibited a lawyer from
giving advice which would further an illegal course of conduct. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 2.3 (Discussion Draft 1980). The Kutak Commission
Journal comments: "The distinction between providing advice and providing informa-
tion about the law was explored, and it was concluded, though not agreed, that there
was no distinction of substantive merit." Journal of the Kutak Commission, 31 (Nov.
21-22, 1980). The distinction between advice and information is not quite the same as
the "critical distinction" mentioned by the current Comment in the Model Rules. How-
ever, the journals of the drafters raise some doubt about their ability to make either
distinction.
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. Any rule which relies on the exact words used by lawyers when talking with
clients must be considered in light of the fact that most lawyers are in a position of
power and superior knowledge in relation to their clients. This inequality of power
and knowledge makes it very difficult for real communication to occur, no matter how
carefully the lawyer chooses her words. See generally Austin Sarat & William L.F.
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uses the command form of the verb, then the lawyer is "coun-
seling or assisting a criminal act" and should be disciplined. On
the other hand, if the lawyer merely answers the client's ques-
tions, then she is "discussing the consequences of a proposed
course of conduct" and should not be disciplined.
Consider the following easy case; the actual transcript of a
conversation overheard by an eavesdropping telephone operator:
The appellant: " . . . I killed her."
The voice in Dallas: "Did you get rid of the weapon?"
The appellant: "No, I still got the weapon."
The voice in Dallas: "Get rid of the weapon and sit tight and
don't talk to anyone, and I will fly down in the morning.""
Of course, the "voice in Dallas" (which belonged to a lawyer)
was violating Model Rule 1.2(d). The fatal error was the use of
the command: "Get rid of the weapon." What if the conver-
sation had been as follows:
Appellant: What would happen if I got rid of the weapon?
The voice in Dallas: If you got rid of the weapon, it would be
harder to convict you.
It is likely that the consequence of that conversation would
have been the same as the consequence of the real one-that
the appellant would get rid of the weapon. However, while the
actual conversation was a clear violation of Rule 1.2(d), the
alternative conversation would have been an appropriate discus-
sion of the legal consequences of a proposed course of action.
Imagine further, a conversation between Client and Lawyer:
Client: I have committed a crime and do not want to go to
jail.
Lawyer: Go to Vietnam. They have no extradition treaty with
us, and they are unlikely to send you back voluntarily.'4
Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office,
98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989).
13. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855
(1953) (concerning the admissibility of the conversation). There is no indication that
the lawyer in Dallas was ever disciplined.
14. Vietnam is not listed under "Extradition" in UNITED STATES TREATY INDEX:
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Again, the lawyer is counseling or assisting a criminal act in
violation of Model Rule 1.2(d). Now consider this one:
Client: I have committed a crime and do not want to go to
jail. What would happen if I went to Vietnam?
Lawyer: We have no extradition treaty with Vietnam. There-
fore, the United States could not force you to come back. Viet-
nam is unlikely to extradite you voluntarily.
The above lawyer is discussing the consequences of a pro-
posed course of conduct. If Model Rule 1.2(d) means what it
says, then the lawyer's conduct is proper.
According to the Model Rules, the command form of the verb
is dangerous to lawyers, while answering questions is not. How-
ever, there are other variations in the dialogue which might fall
between the cracks. For example, does it matter if the "pro-
posed course of conduct" is proposed by the client or the law-
yer? What if the lawyer suggests to the client that the lawyer
cannot give direct advice, but can answer any question which
the client poses? What about leading questions? None of these
permutations should get lawyers into trouble.
A. Client Initiative vs. Lawyer Initiative
Consider the following two interview transcripts from Ken-
neth Mann's Defending White Collar Crime:
Transcript #1
Lawyer: Mr. A was referred to me by his accountant. He
came to me and said, in a nutshell, "I've got $25,000 in
cash on which I have not paid taxes. How can I deposit it
in a bank without creating a mess for myself?" He didn't
tell me where he got the money and I didn't ask. I suppose
this is the type of situation you are talking about ....
First, I told him he had to report the income, what I said
to him was, "Mr. A, it's my obligation to tell you, you have
to report that income." He said to me, "Well, of course, but
that's my decision, which I'll make, but first I want some
answers to a few questions." And then he asked me, "What
1776-1990 CONSOLIDATION 160-61 (Igor I. Kavass ed., 1991).
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if I put it in the bank?" and I answered-his question. And
then he asked, "What if I buy stock with it?" and so
forth .... I told him what happens when he does this or
that; I don't see anything wrong with that, do you?15
Transcript #2
Client: Several years ago, before the SEC started crack-
ing down on overseas payments by corporations to foreign
government officials, we created a fund, which is now held
by a bank in Switzerland, in the name of a company which
is owned by us, though the fact of ownership is not public
record. The fund was created through large yearly business
expense writeoffs for equipment that was never actually
purchased by us or any of our subsidiaries. We are stuck in
a strange position. Due to the SEC enforcement policy we
feel it is imperative that we liquidate the fund, which now
holds over four million dollars. It appears to us that any
way we go about liquidating the fund other than continuing
to pay out in the way we did in the past will eventually
show up as a large expenditure by us for which we will
have no legitimate record. Our question is this: how can we
repatriate the fund without waving a red flag?
Lawyer: [after various questions about the fund and some
extraneous conversation] It would appear to us that the
way to handle this matter is for you to propose various
programs which you have developed for repatriating or
otherwise disposing of the funds. We would then be able to
tell you what we would expect the consequences of such a
program to be.
Client: What do you mean by cbnsequences?
Lawyer: For instance, if you plan on reporting four mil-
lion as profit from a particular foreign subsidiary we would
be able to provide you with some sense of how likely-in
the context of a particular subsidiary and its history-how
likely it is that the report would become a red flag for a
government auditor. 6
15. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHUTE COLLAR CRMIE 116 (1985).
16. Id.
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In Transcript #1, the client asks questions, and the lawyer
answers. In Transcript #2, the lawyer goes a step further and
suggests to the client that she ask questions, which the lawyer
will then answer. Is there anything wrong in either situation?
In In re Bullowa,17 a New York judge made the following
comment:
The effort to distinguish between a "suggestion of a possi-
ble course of action" given by a lawyer to a client, and
"advice or counsel" given by the former to the latter, is
without force or basis. The precise form of words in which
the advice is couched is immaterial. The question is: Has
the lawyer conveyed to the client the idea that by adopting
a particular course of action he may successfully defraud
someone or impede the administration of justice? If a bank
official, who had proved unfaithful to his trust and robbed
his bank, should call upon a lawyer, tell him what he had
done, and ask for his suggestion as to what he should do,
could the lawyer escape responsibility by saying to his cli-
ent, "Have you thought about stealing as much more from
your bank and then going to the southern part of the Ar-
gentina, where you are not likely to be traced for a long
time?" instead of saying directly, "I advise you to steal
twice as much and run away?" In my opinion the precise
language used by a lawyer to his client is immaterial, if its
effect is, not only to advise or counsel, but even to suggest
or indicate, a course of action which will enable the client
to defraud another, or to set the due processes of law at
defiance, or to evade or circumvent them by trickery or
fraud. 8
The judge apparently believed that, if direct advice is a viola-
tion, then so is indirect advice. However, the judge was writing
long before the enactment of the Model Rules. There is nothing
in the Model Rules nor in the predecessor Model Code, which
would suggest that it would matter if it was the lawyer, and
not the client, who had the idea or initiated the discussion. 9
17. 229 N.Y.S. 145 (1928).
18. Id. at 154.
19. MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETHics 146 (1990).
294 [Vol. 28:287
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B. Leading Questions
Consider the following scenario:
A subpoena is issued by a court calling for the client to
produce all documents related to a certain transaction.
Upon receipt, the client takes the subpoena to an attorney
and asks, "How do I proceed?" In the characteristic case of
avoidance, the attorney begins by explaining to the client
what is called for by the subpoena and what significance
certain types of documents would have for the course of the
investigation. He will not blandly ask the client what docu-
ments currently exist but will explain to the client what the
subpoena indicates about the subject and scope of the inves-
tigation. Some attorneys go one step further and explain to
the client what kinds of documents could be used against
the client "if they exist." For example, the attorney says,
"The government is trying to establish that officers in the
corporation had knowledge of the improper evaluation of
assets before the public distribution of the prospectus; if
there are any documents which show such knowledge, these
may be used by the prosecution as evidence for an indict-
ment. Or if there is any document which indicates that an
officer requested certain financial analyses that were not
made, this may also be problematic." In this fashion, an
attorney educates a client as to what constitutes a poten-
tially adverse document. Subsequently, the client takes
several weeks to conduct an independent search.
In many instances, such a discussion is the last detailed
consideration of the type and possible existence of the re-
quested documents. The client is later asked to report to
the attorney whether any such documents were found. And
then he is instructed how to make a formal reply on the
date of appearance before the prosecutor to answer the
subpoena. An attorney who is avoiding inquiry will not ask,
"Did such documents ever exist?" or "Was document X or
document Y found?" His interaction with the client is likely
to be limited to a narrower question: "Do you have anything
to present in response to the subpoena?" An attorney who
was preparing to accompany his client to a U.S. Attorney's
office to make a formal response to a subpoena explained
his mission in the following way.
The client's going to meet me here and then we
are going down to Foley Square [location of U.S.
19941
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Attorney's office in the Southern District of New
York]. I'm not going to ask him whether he has
all the books and records that have been request-
ed. The assistant [U.S. Attorney] will do the ask-
ing. The only thing I'm going to do is to warn
him about-explain to him-the dangers of a
perjury charge. It's then up to him to handle the
response.
In fact, the attorney explained to the client in detail how
to answer the prosecutor's oral questions testing compliance
with the subpoena, after the client said that he did not
have anything to present. "You do not," said the attorney,
"state anything more than 'the documents do not exist.' You
do not say what kind of a search you made, or how you
defined the nature of the documents you were looking for.
All you have to say is that you read the subpoena and.did
not find anything that was described therein."0
There is no difference between other advice, which could be
used to break the law and the sort of leading questions used
here. If the lawyer commanded the client to destroy incriminat-
ing documents, the lawyer would be in violation of the Model
Rules. However, if the client asked about the legal consequenc-
es of tendering certain documents in compliance with the sub-
poena, the lawyer could properly answer the question.2
20. MANN, supra note 15, at 109-10; see also Monroe Freedman, Professional Re-
sponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1469, 1479-80, 1481-82 (1966); FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at ch. 7.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, in its Bounds of Advocacy
Rule 2.13 (1991), take the position that lawyers should never encourage clients to
hide assets.
21. Freedman argues that the "lecture" in the film, "Anatomy of a Murder" is an
example of falsifying evidence, a violation of Model Rule 3.4(b). FRIEDMAN, supra note
19, at 156-57. The "lecture" states in part: "If the facts are as you have stated them,
you have no legal defense, and you will probably be electrocuted. On the other hand,
if you acted in a blind rage, there is a possibility of saving your life. Think it over,
and we'll talk about it tomorrow." FREEDMAN, at 156-157.
This author submits that falsifying evidence is simply a subset of "counseling
or assisting illegal conduct," which is a violation of Model Rule 1.2(d), unless it is
couched as discussing the consequences of a proposed course of conduct, which is
perfectly all right under the same rule.
296 [Vol. 28:287
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C. Applying the Rule-Evidentiary Problems
The analysis of Model Rule 1.2(d) suggests that everything
turns upon the exact words used. Such a rule is difficult to
apply, since evidence of the exact words is rarely available.
Verbatim transcripts have, however, appeared in reported cases
on occasion. In In re Bullowa,2 the lawyer was imprudent
enough to put his advice in the form of a letter. In other cases,
the conversation was reported by an eavesdropping telephone
operator,' or one of the participants was wired.' Reasonably
reliable reports of conversations have also appeared when the
client later sued the lawyer for malpractice based upon the
advice.
Only one case, In re Matter of Mintz, 6 has been found in
which a lawyer actually advised a client on extradition treaties.
Unfortunately, the facts of that case are so bizarre that the
opinion gives little guidance as to the broader issue.
In Mintz, Cappolla, a police informer, consulted Mintz, a
lawyer, about a commercial matter. Believing Cappolla to be a
murderer, Mintz hinted that he might need to hire a contract'
killer. Cappolla informed the police and was outfitted with a
body recorder for his next consultation."
In the next conference, Mintz talked further about the con-
tract killing. He also claimed that he had arranged for a co-
caine sale for some Colombian clients, but had not gone
through with it. Cappolla asked if Mintz could sell ten ounces
of cocaine for him; Mintz replied that he could.28
22. 229 N.Y.S. 145, 147, 149 (1928).
23. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1953), cert. denied, 346 ,U.S. 855 (1953).
24. In re Matter of Edson, 530 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1987); In re Matter of Mintz, 503
A.2d 290 (N.J. 1986).
25. Carr v. Anding, 793 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. 1990); Pantely v. Garris, Garris &
Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1989); see Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Legal
Malpractice Liability for Advising Client to Commit Crime or Unlawful Act, 51 A.L.R.
4th 1227 (1987).
26. 503 A.2d 290 (N.J. 1986).
27. Id. at 292.
28. Id. at 293.
1994] 297
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Mintz also advised Cappolla to see a doctor to obtain a
medical excuse to avoid standing trial for a criminal charge,
and suggested which illnesses he should claim. In addition,
Mintz counselled Cappolla that if he were to jump bail he
should avoid all contact with his family, as bail-jumpers are
often caught when they re-establish contact with their family.
Finally, he told Cappolla that the United States had no extradi-
tion treaty with Brazil.29
The taped conversation was - eventually turned over to the
Ethics Committee in New Jersey. In the disciplinary hearing,
Mintz's psychiatrist testified that Mintz's statements were a
form of fantasizing, and that he really had not meant what he
said.30
The court apparently believed the psychiatrist, but noted that
the client might not have known that Mintz was fantasizing. It
said that it is what the client hears, not what the lawyer in-
tended, that counts."'
The court held that Mintz's comments about contract killers,
and his advice regarding faking illnesses and jumping bail,
violated the ethics code. 2 Mintz was suspended from the prac-
tice for two years and his return to practice was conditioned
upon a clean bill of health as to his personal fitness."
Unfortunately, the court did not mention Mintz's advice about
extradition treaties specifically in its discussion of violations
and penalties. Even if the court had, it would have been diffi-
cult to separate the extradition advice, or even the bail-jumping
advice, from the clearly inappropriate conversations about hired
killers and drug deals.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 294.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 294-95.
33. Id. at 296.
298 [Vol. 28:287
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
A. Legislative History of the Model Rules
The legislative history of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, such as it is, supports the reading of the Model Rules
suggested above. In an earlier draft, a rule was proposed which
would have prohibited a lawyer from giving advice which would
be used to break the law. 4 This rule was not passed.
Therefore, the drafters must have intended that such advice
would be allowed.
B. The American Law Institute Restatement
The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers covers both lawyer ethics and substantive law. 5
Section 192 provides:
(1) A lawyer may advise a client concerning the applica-
bility of law to the client's intended conduct, so long as the
lawyer does not go further and engage in activities de-
scribed in subsection (2).
(2) A lawyer must not assist the client when doing so
would incur liability on the part of the lawyer.
(3) A lawyer may assist a client in an open, good faith
effort to determine the applicability or validity of a law or
court order.3"
Comment (i) provides:
The fact that a client intends to commit criminal or oth-
erwise illegal acts does not by itself entail that a lawyer
must not provide legal advice to the client. A lawyer may
provide such advice for the purpose of indicating to the
client the illegal nature of the activity. A lawyer must not,
however, provide such assistance with the purpose of crimi-
34. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3 (Discussion Draft 1980).
35. See.Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 195 (1987).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 192 (Preliminary
Draft No. 8, 1992). Author's Note: Preliminary Drafts are subject to revision and are
not the formal position of the American Law Institute.
1994] 299
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nally or otherwise illegally assisting the client in the activi-
ty. Under applicable substantive law, the line between per-
missible and impermissible lawyer counseling in such a
situation may turn on circumstances indicating the lawyer's
purpose. Those circumstances may include subtleties of ex-
pression, inflection, or the like on the part of the lawyer
that would warrant a fact finder in concluding that the
lawyer's purpose was wrongful. Providing information to a
client concerning how to shield illegal activities from detec-
tion or how to secure or increase the advantages of illegal
activity would in almost all instances constitute unlawful
assistance.37
Admittedly, the Institute's focus on the lawyer's purpose is
somewhat different from the apparent emphasis of Model Rule
1.2(d) on syntax, but the emphasis on subtleties of expression is
the same and clearly malleable by the unscrupulous lawyer.
Further, the type of evidence mentioned by the ALI Reporter as
relevant to purpose would be just as difficult to produce as the
verbatim transcripts needed in order to apply the Model Rules.
In any event, the last sentence of the Comment goes much too
far.
C. Secondary Authorities
Of three major commentators, only Monroe Freedman ap-
pears to argue that there should be no difference between the
ethics rules and the substantive law.38 The other two, Geoffrey
Hazard and Charles Wolfram, appear to argue that mere advice
can lead to a disciplinary violation, even if it does not violate
the substantive law.39 Freedman argues that, in the compara-
ble provision in the Model Code, "the words 'counsel or assist'
refer to an active kind of participation in the client's illegal act,
going beyond merely giving advice about the law."" In fact, he
37. Id. § 192 cmt. i.
38. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 60 (1975); FREEDMAN, supra note 19.
39. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING §§ 1.2:500 to :511 (2d ed. 1991); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs
694 (1986); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer go in Assisting a Client
in Legally Wrongful Conduct? 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981).
40. FREEDMAN, LAWYER's ETHics IN AN ADERSARIAL SYSTEM, supra note 39, at
300
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supports this point by a reference to a case on aiding or abet-
ting a crime.4' He argues in a later work that the Model Rules
are more liberal than the Model Code. Thus, they are even
more favorable toward mere advice.42
Geoffrey Hazard sees a difference between pure, unsuggestive
advice and pure, instrumental encouragement: "The law clearly
sanctions providing assistance at the least instrumental end of
this spectrum. The law clearly prohibits conduct at the other
end."' One would think that Hazard sees a middle ground in
which a colorable argument can be made that the advice, al-
though somewhat instrumental, is still proper. However, in a
later treatise, all of his illustrative applications of Rule 1.2(d)
seem to be violations, suggesting that there is no middle
ground at all." Charles Wolfram concedes that it is possible to
read Rule 1.2(d) as sanctioning legal advice about methods of
criminal activity, though he characterizes that possibility as
shocking and probably inadvertent.45
IV. CASE LAW
Model Rule 1.2(d), by its language, would allow lawyer advice
which could be used to break the law, as long as the advice is
couched in the right words. However, most commentators do
not read it that way. The result is confusion and anxiety for
lawyers.
The courts could solve the problem by presenting a definitive
interpretation. The substantive law cases are helpful, in that
they require something more than advice before a lawyer is
held liable. Therefore, they support the interpretation of Model
Rule 1.2(d) suggested above. In addition, most of the ethics
cases agree, although there are some cases in the divorce area
that are troublesome.
60.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940)).
42. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 144-46 (1990).
43. HAZARD, supra note 39, at 671.
44. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 4, §§ 1.2:500 to :511. This treatise appears to
deal with substantive law as well as lawyer ethics.
45. WOLFRAM, supra note 39.
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A. General
There can be no doubt that if a lawyer commits a crime she
will be subject to prosecution. Similarly, if a lawyer in concert
with a client commits a crime, with active participation on the
part of the lawyer such as lying to authorities, filing false docu-
ments, and the like, the lawyer can be disciplined46 and crimi-
nally prosecuted.47 It does not help the lawyer in either type of
case if she first advises the client not to break the law, and
then actively helps the client to break it.'
46. In re Matter of Nulle, 620 P.2d 214 (Ariz. 1980); In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15
(N.J. 1974).
47. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. In Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386 (N.J. 1986), a substantive law case, the
decedent executed a power of attorney in favor of his nephew. The nephew obtained
the decedent's consent to sell the decedent's A.T.& T. stock, which constituted a sub-
stantial portion of the decedent's property. The nephew then proposed to use the
proceeds of the stock sale in his own business, giving the decedent an unsecured note
in return. The nephew's lawyer advised him against the stock sale and the loan, but
the nephew did both anyway. The lawyer prepared the note and endorsed the check.
The court reversed summary judgment and held that a valid cause of action lay
against the lawyer.
In S.E.C. v. Universal Major Industries Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied sub nor. Homans v. S.E.C., 434 U.S. 834 (1977), a substantive law case,
the lawyer advised the client that there were too many transferees in a proposed
offering to do an unregistered private placement. He told them to register, but they
did not. The lawyer wrote an opinion letter anyway. The court held that, even though
the lawyer had advised against an unregistered offering, and even though the pur-
ported opinion letter did not, in truth, opine anything, the lawyer had still aided and
abetted the clients in a violation of the securities laws.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488 (Md. 1991), a
lawyer ethics case, the lawyer was retained to represent the client on a DUI charge.
When he learned that the client had given a false name to the arresting officer, the
lawyer told him that he would have to inform the bail bondsman of the false name,
which he did. When bail was set before a Commissioner, the client used a false name
and the lawyer remained silent, standing somewhat apart from his client. Following
the release on bail, the lawyer repeatedly asked his client to reveal the false name
and unsuccessfully sought advice from his fellow lawyers. The lawyer refused to rep-
resent the client at the trial. At the trial, the judge, believing that the defendant was
a first offender, imposed a lenient penalty, but noticing the Florida address, ordered
a presentence report.
At a trial for a previous DUI, the lawyer in question appeared as counsel. The
judge did not know of the subsequent DUI under a false name, did not ask, and the
lawyer did not tell him.
At a subsequent meeting with a probation officer for the presentence investi-
gation, the lawyer accompanied the client. The client continued to use a false name
and the lawyer did nothing to disabuse the probation officer. The court held that,
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In substantive law cases, courts have struggled to draw the
line between mere advice, which does not involve the lawyer in
criminal activity and liability, and some further, active partic-
ipation, which does.49 The lawyer ethics cases do not put a
similar emphasis on the difference between passive advice and
more active assistance. However, in most of the cases in which
lawyers were disciplined, it would appear that the advice was
in the form of a direct command to break the law.50
since it is unusual for lawyers to accompany clients to such meetings, this lawyer's
very presence at the meeting affirmed the fraud, and was a disciplinary violation,
even though none of the lawyer's previous actions were inappropriate.
49. The following cases held that, for the purposes of criminal or civil liability,
the lawyer had not crossed the line from passive advice to active participation: Brown
v. Donco Enterprises, 783 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986); Invictus Records, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 98 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Worldwide Marine
Trading Corp. v. Marine Transport Service, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Assoc. v. Tillamook County Creamery Assoc., 358 F.2d 115
(9th Cir. 1966); Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); State ex
rel. Miller v. Rahmani, 472 N.W.2d 254 (Iowa 1991).
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.3 cmt. 4 (1980) provides, "it is plainly improper
to provide criminal sanctions for a lawyer who advises his client on the law of extra-'
dition."
The ALI RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS notes:
A private lawyer representing a client . . . could under certain circum-
stances be liable for malicious prosecution. To establish such liability, it
is necessary that the lawyer procured the initiation of criminal proceed-
ings, for example by advising the client to institute them, as opposed to
informing the client of available legal options.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78 cmt. e (Preliminary
Draft No. 9, 1993).
The following cases held that the lawyer was guilty of a violation of law: Unit-
ed States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1991) (addressing criminal conspir-
acy to defraud U.S. in bankruptcy matters); FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1387 (1991) (lawyer as general counsel of savings and
loan "directed" that the bank make loans in violation of law, apparently to increase
the law firm's fees); Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (law firm's argument that it had merely
given legal advice was rejected, and the firm was held liable for a violation of the
securities laws); United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 678 (1942) (two lawyers found guilty of criminal conspiracy by advising their
clients to hinder the government in its investigation of an illegal still).
50. In re Edson, 530 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1987) (advising client to lie about quantity
of alcohol consumed); In re Mitchell, 262 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. 1979) (telling or encouraging
witnesses to testify falsely); Townsend v. State Bar of California, 197 P.2d 326 (Cal.
1948) (advising client to convey property to defraud judgment creditors). See generally
Jay Zitter, Annotation, Soliciting Client to Commit Illegal or Immoral Act as Ground
for Discipline of Attorney, 85 A.L.R. 4th 567 (1991).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:287
B. Divorce Cases
The divorce cases present special problems, perhaps due to
the unique history of divorce law. When divorce laws were less
liberal than they are now, divorces were difficult to obtain.
Clients often entered into collusive arrangements to manufac-
ture the evidence necessary to create grounds for divorce in
their home states. Alternatively, they went to "divorce mill"
states and foreign countries where divorces were easier to ob-
tain.5 Clients would do whatever was necessary to invoke the
jurisdiction of such a state, even if it involved defrauding the
court. These collusive and migratory divorces raised significant
issues for those giving legal advice.52 Other issues involving
custody and visitation rights also come up. In migratory divorce
and custody cases, there are instances of mere, passive advice
which were held to be violations of the ethics laws.
1. Collusive and Migratory Divorce
a. Collusive Divorce
Lawyers often participated in collusive divorces.53 Usually,
the scheme inVolved manufacturing evidence of adultery. Some-
times the lawyer actually hired the correspondent who would be
"caught" in the compromising position, as well as the photog-
rapher. Occasionally, the lawyer himself witnessed the event
and testified about it.' In other cases, the lawyer merely rep-
resented a client in the divorce proceeding, without further
51. See Rollo Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
348 (1935); Frank W. Ingram & G.A. Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in
Nevada, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 302 (1935); Peter N. Swisher, Foreign Migratory
Divorces: A Reappraisal, 21 J. FAM. L. 9 (1982-1983).
52. FREEDMAN, supra note 38 at 61; JAMES A. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW 44-55
(1973); Philip Adams & Stephen Adams, Ethical Problems in Advising Migratory Di.
vorce, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 60 (1964); Nathan M. Crystal, Ethical Problems in Marital
Practice, 30 S.C.L. REV. 321, 340-348 (1979); Henry Drinker, Problems of Professional
Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1953). L.C. Di Stasi, Jr.,
Annotation, Participation in Allegedly Collusive or Connived Divorce Proceedings as
Subjecting Attorney to Disciplinary Action, 13 ALR 3d 1010 (1967).
53. See Di Stasi, supra note 52; THE GAY DIVORCEE (RKO 1934).
54. State v. Woodville, 108 So. 309 (La. 1926); In re Forrester, 155 N.Y.S. 420
(1915).
304
LEGAL ADVICE TOWARD ILLEGAL ENDS
participation, or even knowledge, in the manufacture of false
evidence.
Lawyers who participated actively in the collusion were rou-
tinely disbarred.55 As to those lawyers who passively acqui-
esced in presenting evidence which had been manufactured by
others, the discipline was less harsh.56
There were no cases found in which lawyers merely advised
their clients about collusive divorces, without any further par-
ticipation. Therefore, the issue of lawyer discipline for mere
advice did not arise.
b. Migratory Divorce
Early migratory divorce opinions and case law prohibited
mere advice. Some later authorities, however, are less restric-
tive. In ABA Formal Opinion 84," it was inquired whether a
lawyer could properly advise a client to establish residence in
another state solely for purposes of procuring a divorce. The
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances felt that
"residence," when statutorily required for filing an action for
divorce in a particular state, must be construed as "bona fide
residence."5 The residence contemplated by the question was
not bona fide and would be a fraud upon the court. The Com-
mittee opined that a lawyer could not properly counsel his
client to establish such a residence.
In In re Anonymous,59 a lawyer accepted a retainer to pro-
cure a Mexican "mail order" divorce for his New York resident
client. The lawyer knew that neither spouse was a resident of
Mexico and that neither had any intention of going there." He
advised the client that such divorces were invalid under the
55. In re Durant, 67 A. 497 (Conn. 1907); State v. Woodville, 108 So. 309 (La.
1926); In re Herrmann, 161 N.Y.S. 977 (1916); In re Forrester, 155 N.Y.S. 420 (1915);
In re Bayles, 141 N.Y.S. 1052 (1913); Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Freemon, 362 S.W.2d
828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).
56. Florida Bar v. McCaghren, 171 So.2d 371 (1965); In re Cahill, 50 A. 119
(1901).
57. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 84 (1932).
58. Id.
59. 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1948).
60. Id. at 76.
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then current New York decisions. However, he did arrange for
a Mexican lawyer with offices in New York to set the proceed-
ing in motion.6
The lawyer argued that, in the absence of an express prohi-
bition under New York law, he had committed no violation. The
court disagreed, but, since it was a case of first impression,
declined to find the lawyer guilty of misconduct. 2 The court
did, however, state that the next lawyer who did the same
thing would be disciplined.63
In In re Feltman,64 a lawyer told his New Jersey client that
although he had no ground for divorce in New Jersey, an Ala-
bama divorce might be possible.65 The lawyer described the
Alabama residence requirement. The client responded that he
thought that he could get work as a trucker in Alabama so that
the residency requirement would not be a problem.66
The lawyer sent the client a document which purported to
submit him to the jurisdiction of the Alabama court, and ac-
knowledged receipt of a copy of a divorce complaint. Since no
such complaint had been received, or even prepared, the receipt
was a blatant falsehood.67
The court reprimanded the lawyer for the attempted deceit.
As to the advice, however, it commented as follows:
We agree with counsel for both sides that the applicable
ethics standard in a case such as this is set forth in Nappe
v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.2d 31 (1956). We therein indi-
cated that an attorney could properly advise his client con-
cerning the requirements for divorce in other states, and
concerning the client's ability to meet those requirements.
The attorney should also inform his client that any action
in another jurisdiction would be the client's responsibility
and that he might be bound by the judgment of an out-of-




64. 237 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1968).




LEGAL ADVICE TOWARD ILLEGAL ENDS
Once an attorney has done this and leaves it to
the voluntary decision of the client as to whether
such a proceeding is to be instituted by the client
in a foreign jurisdiction, counsel may suggest the
name of a reputable attorney in such other state
so that his client may be advised by such lawyer
who has the competence to give the necessary
legal advice with reference to the contemplated
action. We deem it advisable to state this warn-
ing, however, that at that point the attorney
should terminate the relationship of attorney and
client, present his bill and be paid for his ser-
vices. Any participation thereafter in the divorce
proceeding in the foreign state may form a foun-
dation of a charge that the New Jersey attorney
is particeps criminis when subsequently a fraud is
perpetrated upon the courts of the foreign
state.6
In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krueger,69 the client, a
resident of Illinois, retained the lawyer to obtain a Wisconsin
divorce.70 The lawyer advised him to rent a room in Wisconsin.
When the client had been in Wisconsin for two weeks, the law-
yer filed a divorce petition, which alleged that the client had
been a resident of Wisconsin for more than six months and of
Rock County for more than thirty days prior to the com-
mencement of the action. Subsequently, the client retained oth-
er counsel and testified truthfully about his residency. His di-
vorce petition was dismissed for failure to meet the residency
requirements.7' In the disciplinary hearing, the parties stipu-
lated that the first lawyer's conduct consisted of dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or. misrepresentation, in violation of Wisconsin
20.04(4).72 The referee recommended a public reprimand.
Harsher sanctions were rejected because there was doubt as to
whether the lawyer had knowingly counseled his client to lie, or
whether the lawyer had been merely negligent in monitoring
his client's residency.73 The matter was remanded, due to an
68. Id. at 473-74.




73. Id. at 185.
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apparent conflict between the parties' briefs and the referee's
report.
After further hearings, it was concluded that the lawyer had
reasonably believed that the client could meet the statutory res-
idency requirements under Wisconsin law. The lawyer had not
advised his client to testify falsely, but had listed some of the
ways to prove the required residency intention. 4 The court ac-
cepted the referee's recommendation to give the lawyer a public
reprimand, but declined to hold that the lawyer's conduct had
constituted dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.75
In the recent case of In re Nash,76 a lawyer prepared, nota-
rized, and backdated documents which falsely stated that his
client was a resident of New York. The lawyer apparently be-
lieved that a New York divorce would be quicker and quieter
than the available alternatives.77 The lawyer was disciplined.
ABA Opinion 84 and In re Anonymous take the unduly harsh
position that offering advice about foreign divorces, or finding a
foreign lawyer, without more, can be a violation. Feltman's
holding-that mere advice about foreign divorces and their
consequences, and a referral to foreign lawyers, is unobjection-
able-makes much more sense. Whether one needs to wash
one's hands of the matter as thoroughly as was suggested in
the older New Jersey opinion seems doubtful.
I
Feltman, Nash, and Krueger seem perfectly appropriate, in
that the lawyer certainly lied in Feltman and Nash, and proba-
bly lied in Krueger, thus crossing the line from passive advice
to active malfeasance.
2. Custody and Visitation Issues
The secondary authorities seem to be unanimous that coun-
seling a client to violate a court order in a custody dispute,
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 568 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1991).
77. Id at 937.
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especially through childnapping, is a disciplinary violation.78
The case law and opinion authorities, however, are more varied.
In a North Carolina ethics opinion, a husband and wife were
separated, and the custody of the two children was yet to be
decided. The wife asked her lawyer if she could have an open
relationship with another man, in view of the effect that it
might have on the custody decision. The lawyer wanted to ad-
vise that when the relationship is stable and monogamous, and
the other man's relationship with the children is good, courts
around the country have awarded the woman custody despite
the relationship. The question was whether or not such advice
would be tantamount to encouraging the woman to commit the
crime of cohabitation. The opinion states that, as long as the
lawyer gives a balanced view, and points out the possible ad-
verse consequences and the criminal nature of the relationship,
the lawyer can give that advice.'
In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v.
Kerpelman," the client believed that his estranged spouse had
moved out of state and was living with a criminal. The lawyer
advised him to physically snatch the child from the spouse's
premises, "but not to say anything to anybody about it because
it was not the procedure of attorneys.""' The lawyer advised
him "to try to get in without breaking the door down ... "
and that, if the client were successful, "we might get a faster
response from the court." '
The court accepted the trial judge's findings that the client
had acted upon the lawyer's suggestion in snatching the child,
78. See Donald Tye, How Do You Protect the Child? FAA1. ADvOC. 20, 22 (Winter
1987); ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES § 9.23 (1983); PATRICIA
HOFF ET. AL., INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLI-
CY, PRACTICE AND LAW 16-15 to -16 (1982).
79. North Carolina State Bar, Op. CPR 285 (Oct. 15, 1980); see also AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY Standard 2.14 (1991)
(stating that an attorney must counsel her client regarding the legal ranpification and
the potential effect on custody of her actions).
80. 420 A.2d 940 (Md. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
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not upon his own initiative. For these violations and others, the
lawyer's two-year suspension was upheld.'
In In re Rosenfeld," the client was given temporary custody
of her daughter, but the father was given visitation rights on
weekends. Concerned that the father had been sexually abusing
the child, the client filed a relief-from-abuse petition to prevent
the father from further visits.86 The court consolidated the re-
lief-from-abuse petition with the permanent custody hearing
and refused to prohibit the father from visiting his daughter on
the one weekend remaining before the hearing."
The lawyer told the mother that he could not advise her to
violate the court order granting the father visitation rights.
However, "he told her that he did not think that the judge
would hold it against her if she denied visitation."' He
suggested that if she planned to violate the court order, she
and her daughter should leave home for the weekend. This
tactic would allow her to avoid a direct confrontation with her
ex-husband. The lawyer believed that the client would deny
visitation on the one remaining weekend, and he was right.89
The court referred the matter to a fact-finding committee.
The committee noted that "similar situations arose often in
family practice and many attorneys 'choose to assure the safety
of the child over the sanctity of the court order.'"9" In view of
"the jeopardy his client perceived in granting visitation, the
inability to place the matter before the court prior to the
weekend visit, the loss of only one weekend visit, and the short
time prior to the court hearing,"9 the committee found no
violation. The chairman of the committee dissented and
criticized the application of a different standard for divorce law
practitioners.92
84. Id. at 945-47.
85. 601 A.2d 972 (Vt. 1991), cert. denied, Rosenfeld v. Vermont, 112 S. Ct. 1968
(1992).
86. Id. at 975.
87. Id. at 975-76.
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The court rejected the committee report. It concluded that the
factors relied upon by the committee could be used to mitigate
punishment, but not to ignore the violation. The court agreed
with the dissenting chairman, and suggested that a more rigor-
ous standard should be set for family law attorneys." For this
violation and others, the lawyer was suspended for six months,
with his reinstatement conditioned upon a passing score on a
professional responsibility exam and a demonstration of im-
proved office management skills.94
Two out of three custody and visitation cases were correctly
decided. The North Carolina ethics opinion properly allows the
lawyer to give advice, even though that advice might be used to
break an old law. In Kerpelman, the lawyer went beyond mere
advice. A reading of the remainder of that opinion would sug-
gest that the lawyer would have been disbarred even if that
particular issue had been decided the other way.
In Rosenfeld, the court was correct that once a court had
weighed the issue of the child's safety over the father's visita-
tion rights, it was not proper for the lawyer and client to make
an independent judgment. However, it seems that the lawyer's
statements were much closer to a discussion of the consequenc-
es of proposed conduct than they were to encouraging illegal
activity. Accordingly, the lawyer's advice should not have been
a violation.
V. CONCLUSION
Kenneth Mann decries the vagueness of the ethics rules on
the question of legal advice. He fears that with the existing
ambiguity "the well-intentioned attorney is ineffectively guided,
the wavering attorney is ineffectively warned, and the cynical,
devious attorney is provided with excuses."95 Still, lawyer eth-
ics codes must be vague. Given the staggering variations in
lawyers, clients, and situations, no code could ever provide
93. Id. at 976.
94. Id. at 978.
95. MANN, supra note 15, at 248. Mann is discussing the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, but his remarks would apply equally to the Model Rules.
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precise guidance in all situations. Too much precision would
necessarily convict the innocent or free the guilty.
Vague lawyer ethics guidelines are inevitable. Moreover, they
have two very helpful attributes. First, they make it very diffi-
cult for lawyers to be prosecuted unless their conduct is egre-
gious. Second, they make all lawyers nervous, all of the time.
That is a good way for lawyers to be.
Vagueness is particularly inevitable when it comes to the
regulation of lawyer advice. There are two conflicting goals.
Lawyers should not encourage their clients to break the law.
However, lawyers must be free to tell their clients what the
law is, and how it would apply to their proposed conduct. There
is no way for an ethics code to reconcile these two worthwhile
goals without being ambiguous. Moreover, it will be the rare
case in which we can be sure what the lawyer's advice to the
client was, and how it was communicated.
In view of the inevitable ambiguity and near impossibility of
discerning the relevant facts, there are two possible responses.
Either all lawyers should be guilty-or none. To say that all
lawyers are guilty is to say that any lawyer who ever advises a
client in any way which might be construed as encouraging ille-
gal activity is guilty of violating the ethics rules.
The proper response is that no lawyers are guilty. As a mat-
ter of legal ethics, it is simply too difficult to distinguish proper
from improper legal advice, even if all the facts are known.
Additionally, the facts will almost never be known. The ethics
rules should leave the matter of lawyer advice alone and let the
substantive law take care of it.
Subjecting lawyer advice to both the substantive law and the
ethics laws risks confusion, improper standards, and a chilling
effect on a necessary function of lawyers. Lawyers are anxious
enough about giving advice under the constraints of substantive
law. There is no need to add to their peril.
Society is protected from the harm that improper advice can
cause in a number of ways. First, the one who would actually
break the law is the client. If the client breaks the law and is
caught, the client will be punished. Second, if the lawyer goes
312 [Vol. 28:287
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too far in giving improper advice, the lawyer can be liable for
breaking the law himself."
So much for what the lawyer can and cannot do. Now, what
should the lawyer do? As a general matter, lawyers should
ensure that clients, as citizens, have access to the law so that
they can make their own decisions as to how to behave. Law-
yers lack moral authority to make those decisions for them.
Should the lawyer only give questionable advice if the client
asks for it in the right way? Should the lawyer answer ques-
tions only when asked and never make suggestions? Such a
tactic would effectively deny access to the law to those who
need it most and grant it only to those who were already quite
sophisticated before they walked into the law office. Naive cli-
ents, as well as those who are more sophisticated, have the
right to make their own decisions.
What if it seems clear that the client seeks to use the
lawyer's advice in a way which the lawyer finds repugnant? A
balance must be struck between the client's autonomy and the
lawyer's unwillingness to take part in a wrong. Clearly, under
the Model Rules, the lawyer can withdraw.97 When should she
do so?
On this question, Monroe Freedman's formulation should be
combined with Kenneth Mann's. Freedman argues that the
lawyer should not give advice when that advice will be used to
do harm.98 On that basis, advice on migratory divorce is harm-
96. The ethics code can bootstrap the surrounding law through the MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983), which states that "[l]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Model
Rule 8.4(c) states that "[It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 8.4(C)(1983).
Substantive laws are difficult to administer, due to similar evidentiary
problems. Perhaps they are especially troublesome when applied to lawyers. The driv-
er of a getaway car is much more involved than the lawyer on the sidelines, no mat-
ter how active her encouragement. However, exempting lawyers from liability which
pertains to everyone else would be putting lawyers above the law. That is the last
thing that should be done.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(2)-(3) (1983). See ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (dis-
cussing the question of noisy withdrawal).
98. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 146-47.
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less and appropriate, while advice on childnapping is harmful
and inappropriate.
When, however, do you know that your client intends to
commit harm? Lawyers are allowed to presume that their
clients intend to obey the law. 99 This presumption is necessary
if lawyers and clients are to have any relationship of trust.
Kenneth Mann suggests that, when the client has made it
obvious to the lawyer that the client intends to use the lawyer's
advice to break the law, then the lawyer should not give that
advice.00 Mann's formulation on knowledge should be com-
bined with Freedman's formulation on harm. When the client
has made it obvious that she intends to use the lawyer's advice
to harm others, then the lawyer should not give that advice.
Lawyers should not be hired guns, but they should also not
be cops. They might even be their clients' friends. If lawyers
are actively involved in lawbreaking, they should be punished,
just like anyone else-no more, no less. Short of violations of
the substantive law, however, lawyers should be free to advise
their clients so that the clients have access to the law, and the
choice as to how to make use of it.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 192 cmt. h (Prelim-
inary Draft No. 8, 1992).
100. MANN, supra note 15, at 247.
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